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State Owned Enterprises as Bribe Payers: The Role of Institutional Environment 
 
Abstract Our paper draws attention to a neglected channel of corruption – the bribe payments by 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This is an important phenomenon as bribe payments by SOEs 
fruitlessly waste national resources, compromising public welfare and national prosperity. Using 
a large dataset of 30,249 firms from 50 countries, we show that, in general, SOEs are less likely 
to pay bribes for achieving organizational objectives owing to their political connectivity. 
However, in deteriorated institutional environments, SOEs may be subject to potential 
managerial rent seeking behaviors, which disproportionately increases SOE bribe propensity 
relative to privately-owned enterprises (POEs). Specifically, our findings highlight the 
importance of fostering democracy and rule of law, reducing prevalence of corruption and 
shortening power distance in reducing the incidence of SOE bribery. 
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Introduction 
 
The issue of corporate bribery has received significant attention in management, ethics and 
international business research. Scholars have examined a variety of topics including the causes 
of bribery (Lee et al. 2010; Powpaka 2002; Wu 2009), institutional influences on bribery 
behavior (Husted 1999; Martin et al. 2007) and strategies for curtailing organizational corruption 
(Misangyi et al. 2008). Despite the variety of research focuses so far, few studies have casted 
spotlight on the bribe payments by state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  
Ignoring SOE bribery leaves open an important research gap as international media has 
found SOEs across multiple countries to bribe politicians and public officials (e.g. South China 
Morning Post 2012; The Economist 2014; The Guardian 2015). As SOEs are mainly financed by 
people’s taxes and play an important role in promoting public welfare (Estrin et al. 2016; Meyer 
et al. 2014; Zhang et al. 2011), bribe payments by SOEs may drain precious public funds, 
compromising SOE effectiveness and jeopardizing national competitiveness (Ramamurti and 
Vernon, 1991; Sun 2004). Therefore, the problem of SOE bribery is increasingly garnering 
attention of public policy makers and many governments are launching crackdowns against SOE 
bribery (e.g. Chow 2013; Global Times 2014; South China Morning Post 2012). However, a 
theoretical understanding of factors that trigger SOE bribery is still scarce, even though 
prominent economic forums, such as Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), has emphasized the need for advancing research on the role of SOEs not only as bribe 
takers but also as bribe payers (OECD Foreign Bribery Report 2014). In this paper, we address 
this gap by identifying and empirically evaluating some important drivers of SOE bribery.  
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We draw from SOE literature to argue that some intrinsic characteristics of SOEs may 
distinguish SOE bribery behavior from that of privately owned enterprises (POEs). In general, 
organizations resort to bribery for the purpose of achieving some business related benefits (Ades 
and Di Tella, 1999; Jeong and Weiner, 2012; Rose-Ackerman 1978). As SOEs can capitalize on 
their political connectivity for achieving their goals, they are likely to have lower bribe 
propensity compared with POEs (Buckley et al. 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009; Lee et al. 
2010). While these contentions hold in general, SOEs operating under weaker institutional 
environments may be influenced by some important secondary considerations of their managers, 
which may disproportionately increase SOE bribery, narrowing down the gap between SOE and 
POE bribe propensities. Mainly, SOEs are embedded in large bureaucratic systems (Boisot and 
Child, 1988; Eggertsson 1990; Lee et al. 2010; Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2014), where careers of 
SOE managers hinge on the fondness of politicians and public officials across government 
apparatus (Estrin et al. 2016; Peng and Luo, 2000). Hence, SOE managers may strive to please 
senior officials outside their organizations and one important way for SOE managers is to induce 
their organizations for entertaining the bribe requests of these influential officials, even if 
organizational goals could be achieved through other means (e.g. lobbying). Such tendencies 
may be particularly prominent in countries where institutions fail to mitigate the misconduct of 
SOE managers via adequate monitoring, leading to severe agency problems in SOEs.   
If SOE bribe propensity is partly determined by the appropriation motives of their 
managers, we expect SOE bribery to be triggered by absence of democracy, ineffective rule of 
law, prevalence of corruption and high power distance. This is because SOEs in less democratic 
and more corrupt societies are more likely to face inadequate monitoring and higher agency 
problems (Estrin et al. 2016). Similarly, ineffective rule of law and high power distance may 
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subject SOE managers to greater influence of hierarchical structures (Boisot and Child, 1988; 
Boisot and Child, 1996; de Soto 2000), inducing SOE managers to please higher ranked officials 
by entertaining their bribe requests. We find empirical support for these theoretical contentions 
in a cross-national sample of 30,249 firms, including both SOEs and POEs, from 50 countries.  
Our study makes important contributions to the literatures on institutions and business 
ethics. Going beyond the relationship between institutions and corporate ethics, we analyze how 
institutional influences vary across different types of organizations. We enrich this line of 
thinking by theorizing how intrinsic SOE characteristics interact with certain institutional factors 
to distinguish SOE bribery behavior from that of POEs. Hence, we show how studying 
institutional influences with respect to organizational attributes can advance current research on 
business ethics and institutional theory.  
We also enrich corruption literature by cross-fertilizing SOE literature with bribery 
research. While bribery is traditionally conceptualized as an economic transaction geared at 
achieving organizational objectives (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1978), we 
indicate the possibility that managerial expropriation may also influence the likelihood of 
organizational bribery in SOEs. Hence, we contend that considering the varieties of motivations 
behind bribe payments, besides merely achieving firm objectives, can provide greater 
explanatory power to existing theoretical frameworks.  
Finally, we address the critical topic of SOE bribery which is increasingly garnering 
attention in real world. For practitioners, the distinction we identify between bribery behaviors of 
SOEs and POEs may pave the way for devising more targeted policies to curb bribery in 
different sectors. We also present SOE bribery as an important domain for future research, which 
offers the potential of enriching our theoretical understanding of corporate bribery. 
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Theory and Hypotheses 
 
The research on organizational bribery is nested in broad literature on business ethics (McLeod 
et al. 2016), and particularly on corporate illegality and unethical behavior, which deal with 
business engagement in unethical or illegal activities (Baucus and Near, 1991; McKendall and 
Wagner, 1997; Mishina et al. 2010; Yiu et al. 2014). However, bribery literature maintains a 
unique focus on unofficial payments made by organizations to public officials in order to receive 
business related benefits (Lee and Weng, 2013; Uhlenbruck et al. 2006), providing important 
theoretical understanding of unethical interactions between businesses and authorities. 
Accordingly, we follow prior scholars (e.g. Boles 2014; Hess 2009; Sanyal 2005; Wrage and 
Wrage, 2005) who define bribery as offering, promising, or giving something to a public official 
in order to obtain or retain a business. Particularly, we focus on bribes that are paid from 
company accounts to government officials.  
Scholars have long recognized the tendency of firms to pay bribes in order to achieve their 
organizational goals and also identified a number of factors that may trigger corporate bribery 
(Lee et al. 2010). For instance, some researchers view firms as victims who resort to bribery 
when societies institutionalize bribery and corruption as social norms (Argandoña 2005; Rose-
Ackerman 2002; Spencer and Gomez, 2011; Vaughan 1999). Such corrupt institutions force 
firms to pay bribes in exchange for even their basic, legitimate rights such as access to 
infrastructures (Powpaka 2002; Treisman 2000). However, other researchers recognize that firms 
may act as perpetrators, who actively and purposefully seek unfair advantages through bribery 
(Clarke and Xu, 2002; Cuervo-Cazurra 2006; Martin et al. 2007; Wu 2009). For example, De 
Jong et al. (2012) note that entrepreneurs bribe government officials to mobilize resources, win 
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contracts, and cope with the constraints imposed by bureaucratic structures. Lee and Weng 
(2013) also report that firms may use bribes to gain permits for production and sales of 
questionable products that do not meet quality standards.  
Regardless of whether institutions force firms into bribery or firms actively supply bribes, 
the literature largely treats bribery as an economic transaction, assuming that firms will bribe 
only when the business benefits of doing so outweigh its costs (e.g. Ades and Di Tella, 1999; 
Brass et al. 1998; Lee et al. 2010; Martin et al. 2007; Rose-Ackerman 1978). Scholars argue that 
illicit payments essentially provide businesses an opportunity to enhance efficiency (Iriyama et 
al. 2016; Mishina et al. 2010). For instance, firms in weaker institutional environments may face 
additional costs from delays in government approvals or prolonged dealings with public officials 
(Banfield 1975; Svensson 2003; Zhou and Peng, 2012). Such firms may use bribes to overcome 
institutional voids insofar as the cost of bribery is lower than the costs imposed by weaker 
institutions. Similarly, for firms that opt to gain illegitimate benefits through bribe payments, 
bribery mainly serves as an investment, justifiable only when bribery confers a strategic or 
tactical advantage that is otherwise costly or difficult to obtain (Lee and Weng, 2013; Webb et al. 
2009). For example, Montiel et al. (2012) noted that even in highly corrupt societies, firms may 
not bribe to obtain various certifications if the cost of bribery exceeds the cost of implementing 
the required standards. 
If bribery is conceptualized as an economic transaction geared at achieving organizational 
objectives, one would posit that SOEs are less likely to pay bribes as their affiliation with state 
authorities provides them various business benefits without incurring the cost of bribe payments. 
By definition, SOEs are organizations that are under direct state ownership and whose objectives 
are mostly aligned with the goals of their respective governments (Jia 2014; Meyer et al. 2014; 
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Shi et al. 2014; Zhang et al. 2011). Given that the success of SOEs is in the state’s best interests, 
the government would preferentially provide various public services to facilitate the business 
operations of SOEs, shielding SOEs from the necessity of paying bribes for overcoming 
institutional voids. By the same token, governments may help SOEs in commanding any 
strategic or tactical advantage necessary for their sustained success, without payments of bribes 
(Herrera and Rodriguez, 2003; Lee et al. 2010). Hence, if the assumption of economic 
motivations underlying bribery activities holds true, one should not expect SOEs to be caught on 
paying bribes, even in underdeveloped institutional environments.  
Despite these theoretical contentions, media (e.g. The Economist 2014; The Guardian 
2015) and researchers (e.g. Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Chow 2013; Li 2013) have been 
increasingly reporting cases of SOE bribery, particularly in emerging economies characterized 
by weaker institutions. For instance, there have been a series of accusations related to bribe 
payments by SOEs to politicians in Brazil, which led to high profile investigations of many 
prominent Brazilian SOEs including Correios, Banco do Brasil, Petrobras and Furnas 
(Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2014). In fact, Petrobras has recently written off US$ 2 billion as 
bribery related costs (CNN 2015). Similarly, Sun (2004) studied a number of bribery incidents in 
China and concluded that SOE bribery is more serious than POE bribery as it encourages corrupt 
connections among officials across SOEs. His concern appears well warranted in light of the 
recent crackdown by Chinese government on corruption, which revealed lucrative bribe 
payments by SOEs to public officials and the Communist Party leaders (Global Times 2014; 
South China Morning Post 2012). While there is a clear gap between theoretical frameworks and 
real world observations, little effort has been made to specifically analyze SOEs as bribe payers. 
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We argue that this gap arises from the fact that framing bribery in economic terms 
dismisses the variety of motives that could shape organizational bribery behavior, especially in 
the context of SOEs. In particular, bribe paying organizations may be driven by the unethical 
behavior of their own managers who can extract personal rents while paying bribes on behalf of 
their organizations (Cuervo-Cazurra 2006; Jeong and Weiner, 2012). We argue that these 
secondary considerations of extracting personal rents may be more prominent in SOEs mainly 
because SOEs are subject to severe agency problems and hierarchical structures, which – 
particularly in weak institutions – may disproportionately increase SOE bribe propensity.  
Firstly, SOE bribery may be subject to managerial rent extraction because SOEs face 
relatively higher agency problems compared with POEs under weak institutions. As argued by 
Laffont and Tirole (1993), SOEs have no individual owners, who would have strong incentives 
of closely monitoring managerial misconduct. Even in publicly traded SOEs, managers are 
unlikely to encounter the same level of market controls as POE managers (Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 
2014). Therefore, when national institutions fail to adequately discipline the conduct of SOE 
managers (Estrin et al. 2016), the inherent weaknesses in SOE monitoring may give some leeway 
for SOE managers to fulfill their personal goals using financial resources of their organizations.  
Secondly, compared to POEs, SOEs have relatively lower focus on financial performance, 
which may facilitate managers to extract rents through bribe payments. As noted by various 
scholars (e.g. Dharwadkar et al. 2000; Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; La Porta and López-de-Silanes, 1999; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988), governments as SOE 
owners are driven to achieve social objectives, and less likely to hold SOE managers accountable 
for financial goals such as cost reduction and profit improvement. The compensation schemes in 
most SOEs tend not to be linked to economic performance but instead follow bureaucratic 
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criteria such as hierarchy and seniority (Dixit 2002). Therefore, SOE managers may perceive 
little incentive for saving costs and find it more beneficial to entertain the bribe requests of senior 
officials in expectation of building personal connections and reaping personal benefits such as 
career progression.  
Finally, the embeddedness of SOEs with other government organizations in a hierarchical 
structure (Boisot and Child, 1988; Eggertsson 1990) may provide SOE managers with the 
channels required to seek personal benefits from bribe payments. Under the hierarchal structure 
of SOEs, incentive arrangement, promotions, and appointments of SOE managers are all subject 
to the approval of political figures and public officials (Dixit 2002; Estrin et al. 2016; Peng and 
Luo, 2000). Accordingly, SOE managers tend to pay significant attention to pleasing political 
and bureaucratic officials outside their organizations (Mi and Wang, 2001; Nguyen 2006). 
Moreover, it is documented that an organization will be more likely to engage in corruption 
when its members have strong social identification with other entities upon which it is dependent 
(Pinto et al. 2008). As SOE managers and the other public officials or politicians belong to the 
same bureaucratic system, they share a similar social identification. As a result, when SOE 
managers decide to bribe for achieving certain organizational objectives, they are likely to take 
into consideration their personal rapport with the bribe-taking officials along with the potential 
benefits to their organizations.  
Due to these intrinsic characteristics of SOEs, we expect SOE bribery behavior to differ 
from POE bribery behavior, which has been the focus of the existing studies. To address this 
research gap, we draw from literature on SOEs to develop hypotheses regarding some distinctive 
features of SOE bribery behavior, with particular reference to the institutional environments of 
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SOEs. We contend a closer investigation of SOE bribe payments will enrich business ethics 
literature by highlighting the hidden facets underlying corporate bribery.   
 
SOE bribery behavior 
 
The research on SOEs has identified various differences between SOEs and POEs particularly in 
terms of their corporate objectives (Meyer et al. 2014; Zhang et al. 2011) and political 
connectivity (Clarke and Xu, 2002; Martin et al. 2007; Nguyen 2006). These distinctions may 
lead to some important differences between bribery behaviors of SOEs and POEs, reducing SOE 
bribe propensity in general. 
First, government ownership mandates SOEs to achieve certain state goals that may 
differ from typical commercial objectives (Gupta 2005; Lee et al. 2010; Vernon 1979). This 
relatively lower emphasis on profit-seeking is likely to reduce the incentives for SOEs to 
undertake bribery as a means to obtain commercial benefits like reduced taxes, monopoly 
creation, and procurement contracts, which are found to be the major drivers for corporate 
bribery (Clarke and Xu, 2002; Powpaka 2002; Rose-Ackerman 2002). Instead, as missions of 
SOEs align with the political and socioeconomic agendas of their governments (Meyer et al. 
2014; Zhang et al. 2011), state authorities would have a vested interest in the successes of SOEs. 
Accordingly, government and public officials are less likely to demand bribes in order for them 
to extend preferential treatments to SOEs (Cui and Jiang, 2012; Shi et al. 2014; Vaaler and 
Schrage, 2009). Past research has also found that SOEs receive various favors from government 
offices in the form of loans, procurement contracts, and favorable legislation (Lee et al. 2010; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
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Second, the political connectivity of SOEs may provide them alternatives avenues to 
bribery in pursuit of their organizational goals. The connections with state authorities enable 
SOEs to approach and lobby public officials in attempts for desirable benefits (Bennedsen et al. 
2009; Clarke and Xu, 2004). Furthermore, SOEs can offer indirect benefits, such as 
appointments of relatives on key position in SOEs, to politician and government officials instead 
of making illicit payments (Boycko et al. 1996; Krueger 1990; Lee and Weng, 2013). Therefore, 
we hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 1 State-owned enterprises are less likely to engage in bribery than POEs.  
Our baseline hypothesis suggests that government affiliation, in general, may reduce SOE 
bribe propensity as compared to POEs. However, organizational bribery is a complex 
phenomenon, which tends to vary across institutions, firms, and industries (Lee et al. 2010; Wu 
2009). In this paper, we emphasize on institutional determinants of bribery because SOEs are, by 
definition, a part of their home-country institutions (Cui and Jiang, 2012; Zhang et al. 2011). 
Accordingly, Estrin et al. (2016) applied Williamson’s (2000) hierarchy of institutions to argue 
that the conduct of SOEs is mainly a function of institutional quality as weaker institutions 
subject SOEs to less effective monitoring, tolerating many self-serving actions by SOE 
managers. POEs, on the other hand, are active agents who only conform to local institutional 
environment when it is strategically beneficial for their organizations (Goodstein 1994; Oliver 
1991; Scott 2005). Even under weaker institutional environments, POE managers are subject to 
relatively stricter monitoring which prevents many self-serving managerial behaviors (Cuervo-
Cazurra 2006; Fisman and Gatti, 2006). 
Extending these insights into the context of corporate bribery, we argue that institutions 
may have a closer bearing on SOE bribery compared with POEs for two main reasons. First, 
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public officials in weaker institutions may target even SOEs for paying bribes to attain 
organizational goals. Second, SOE managers in weaker institutional environments may take 
advantage of relatively inadequate monitoring and entertain bribe requests from higher officials 
in a hope to reap personal benefits. The effect of institutions, however, may be less salient on 
POE bribery. Even when stronger institutions strictly prohibit bribery, corrupt POEs may still 
strive to entice public officials to accept bribes in exchange for business benefits (Martin et al. 
2007). Similarly, when weaker institutions force firms to bribe, POEs may refuse bribe requests 
that do not make economic sense for organizations.  
In the following sections, we focus on political (democracy), regulatory (rule of law), 
social (public perception about prevalence of corruption) and cultural (power distance) 
institutional factors. The premise is that if SOE bribe propensity is determined by agency 
problems and hierarchical structures as argued, these factors should exhibit a stronger effect on 
SOE bribery than POE bribery. More specifically, as institutional quality deteriorates, SOE bribe 
propensity shall excessively increase compared with POEs, narrowing down the gap between 
bribe propensities of SOEs and POEs.  
 
Democratic system 
 
Democratic system refers to an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in 
which individuals endeavor to acquire political office through competition for the votes of a 
broad electorate (Becker 1958). Research by economists and political scientists have stressed the 
importance of democratic traditions in stimulating such competition by which politicians tend to 
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improve the accuracy of their checks and balances, subsequently leading to lower corruption 
across society (Rock 2009; Treisman 2000).  
We expect that the effect of democracy will be more pronounced for SOE bribe propensity 
because democracy makes politicians accountable to real principals (citizens of the country), 
motivating politicians to improve monitoring and reduce agency problems in order to improve 
SOE performance (Aharoni 1982; Boswell and Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Wong 2004). This may reduce the incentive for SOE managers to please politician and 
public officials through lucrative bribe payments as managerial appointments and promotions in 
performance focused SOEs are likely to be made on merit (Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2014).  
While democracy may also reduce bribes paid for the sole purpose of achieving 
organizational benefits, we expect the impact to be more salient for SOE bribery. Various 
scholars have noted POE tendency to bribe even under well-functioning democratic systems 
because POEs attempt to influence the formulation of laws and other government policies to 
their own advantage through illicit or non-transparent means including bribery, a practice termed 
as state capture (Grzymala-Busse 2008; Kunicová 2006; Omelyanchuk 2001). POEs in 
democratic systems may also bribe for safeguarding their interests against potential instability 
caused by frequently shifting policies and changes in electoral representatives after every 
election (Olson 1993; Zhou and Peng, 2012). Additionally, politicians in democratic systems 
may tend to demand and accept bribes from POEs in order to cover massive election campaign 
expenditures. Voters may also approve such illegal contributions if they benefit personally from 
the corrupt politician's largesse (Boswell and Rose-Ackrman, 1996).  
By contrast, SOEs are less likely to need bribery for achievement of their organizational 
objectives because they enjoy closer relationships with elected or appointed public authorities 
 State Owned Enterprises as Bribe Payers 
14 
 
regardless of changes in governments, legislations and policies (Nguyen and Dijk, 2012; Nguyen 
2006). In absence of the secondary considerations of pleasing bribe receiving officials, SOE 
managers are more likely to capitalize on their political connectedness to achieve SOE goals, 
instead of resorting to bribery. Predatory politicians in democratic system may also avoid 
demanding bribes from SOEs as deterioration in SOE performance may risk their own political 
careers. Even if bribery does facilitate SOEs in attainment of organizational goals, democracy 
may prevent SOEs from engaging in bribery. As Wong (2004) notes, elected politicians may not 
be appreciated for their achievement but are called into account when things go wrong. Fearful 
of any backlash, politicians would be less tolerant of SOE bribery even if it improves 
organizational performance. Therefore, while democratic system is expected to curb bribery by 
both SOEs and POEs, we expect the effect to be greater for SOEs due to improved monitoring 
and a focus on performance. 
Hypothesis 2 The relationship of SOEs with bribe propensity will be negatively moderated 
under a democratic system, such that SOE bribe propensity decreases more than that of POEs in 
more democratic countries.  
 
Rule of law 
 
Rule of law refers to the extent to which citizens abide by state regulations and the degree to 
which the authorities fairly and capably enforce the law (Kaufmann et al. 2008). The concept of 
the rule of law encompasses not only the existence of fair and predictable rules but also an 
adequate oversight by regulatory bodies and enforcement of formal laws (Kaufmann et al. 2010; 
Oh and Oetzel, 2011). Any deterioration in rule of law grants excessive power to government 
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officials who can authoritatively decide how resources will be distributed among different 
sectors of society, including business organizations (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002; Bruno et al. 
2013). Hence, predatory officials can demand bribes from businesses in exchange of the 
provision of various services whereas victim organizations may be better off bribing powerful 
government officials instead of appealing to ineffective legal institutions (Friedman et al. 2003; 
Nwabuzor 2005).  
 We argue that SOE bribe propensity may increase more than that of POEs in societies 
that are governed by discretions of individual government officials, rather than formal and 
codified laws. As rule of law weakens, social ties and networks with influential officials become 
crucial for success and bribery may be needed for establishing and cultivating such relationships 
(Boist and Child, 1996; de Soto 2000; Luo and Chung, 2005). SOEs may be particularly 
vulnerable to such pressures because connections with powerful officials have important 
bearings for personal careers of SOE managers. When incentives and promotions of SOE 
managers are determined by their ties with powerful officials instead of established procedures, 
SOE managers may not dare to refuse the bribe demand by corrupt officials even if they could 
achieve organizational objectives through other means. The connectivity with powerful officials 
may also protect bribe paying SOE managers should they come under investigation due to 
allegations of unnecessary bribe payments. This is because such investigations are mostly 
conducted by public officials themselves, as opposed toneutral, third parties (Krueger 2009).  
The increase in POE bribe propensity may be lower than that of SOEs under weakened 
rule of law because POEs may look for more efficient alternatives to achieve organizational 
objectives and use bribery only as a last resort. Furthermore, POEs may be aware that their 
managers can strive to cultivate personal relationships with powerful authorities by unnecessarily 
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entertaining bribe requests. Therefore, as noted by Cuervo-Cazurra (2006), POEs would strictly 
monitor their managers to ensure that bribes are paid only when organizational objectives could 
not be met otherwise. Finally, many POEs with foreign ownerships are bound by laws of their 
home countries and avoid paying bribes even at the cost of suffering business related losses. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that   
Hypothesis 3. The relationship of SOEs with bribe propensity will be negatively moderated by 
rule of law, such that SOE bribe propensity decreases more than that of POEs in countries with 
stronger rule of law.  
 
Corruption perception and social norms 
 
The general perception about the prevalence of corruption corresponds to the institutionalization 
of corruption in given countries (Spencer and Gomez, 2011). Institutionalization or 
normalization of corruption refers to a situation in which violation of a "hypernorm”, a standard 
of right and wrong that transcends organizational and national cultures, turns into an impersonal 
norm and acceptable procedure (Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994; 
Spicer et al. 2004). Once bribery is institutionalized, firms may start seeking legitimacy by 
matching their behaviors with societal expectations regarding bribe payments (DiMaggio and 
Powel, 1983; Gao 2010; Venard and Hanafi, 2008). For instance, when former chairman of 
China Railway Container Transport, Luo Jinbao, was accused for accepting bribes from other 
SOEs, he reported that it is a norm for Chinese SOEs to give about 2% of their total budget to the 
regional railway bureaus after winning a bid (South China Morning Post 2012).  
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We expect that the prevalence of corruption in a society may have a more profound impact 
on SOE bribery compared with POEs. As bribery practices are normalized in a society, SOE 
managers may not take the risk by negotiating bribe requests or seeking alternative means to 
achieve organizational objectives. In fact, refusing bribe demands may put SOE managers in a 
disadvantaged position as different SOE managers compete in the same political system for 
promotions and career growth. This may develop strong peer pressure, further reducing the 
capability of SOE managers to resist bribe demands. Hence, SOE managers may take advantage 
of normalized corruption in society by unnecessarily using SOE funds to entertain the bribe 
requests of senior officials and expect personal favors in return.  
The prevalence of corrupt practices may be relatively modest in POEs because they widely 
differ in their corporate policies and ethical codes of conduct. For instance, while it is 
conceivable that some POEs competing for government contracts may follow bribery behaviors 
of each other, many POEs may not join the bandwagon because their policies or foreign 
affiliations prohibit bribe payments. Similarly, POEs who are faced with weak competitive 
pressures or rarely deal with government customers may not indulge in bribery regardless of how 
commonplace bribery is in the society. Even bribe paying POEs may surrender to the social 
norm of bribery only when perceived benefits to organizations are substantial (Gao 2010), 
whereas SOEs are more likely to entertain bribe requests by senior officials in such 
environments. Therefore, social norms about corruption may have a relatively modest impact on 
POE bribe propensity compared with that of SOEs. 
Hypothesis 4. The relationship of SOEs with bribe propensity will be positively moderated by 
perception of corruption, such that SOE bribe propensity increases more than that of POEs in 
countries with higher perception of corruption. 
 State Owned Enterprises as Bribe Payers 
18 
 
 
Power distance 
 
While all dimensions of cultures have been found to influence different aspects of corporate 
behaviors, we focus on the cultural dimension of power distance as we expect power distance to 
have a more profound impact on SOE bribe propensity. This is because, as argued by Shane 
(1994, 1995), power distance is particularly salient when hierarchical structures are prominent 
and power holders enjoy greater authority over subordinates. As SOEs are embedded in 
hierarchical bureaucratic systems where SOE managers are dependent on senior officials across 
government apparatus for their careers (Boisot and Child, 1988; Eggertsson 1990; Estrin et al. 
2016; Peng and Luo, 2000), an increase in power distance is likely to strengthen this dependence, 
forcing SOE managers to entertain bribe requests of senior officials even when organizational 
goals could be met otherwise.  
As argued by various scholars (Hofstede 2001; Takyi-Asiedu 1993; Waldman et al. 
2006), power holders in high power distance societies may face fewer checks and balances on 
their use of power, leading to a stronger temptation to enrich themselves illegally. In fact, high-
level public officials consider bribe extortion as a privilege of their class, and they are relatively 
more tolerant to corrupt practices (Getz and Volkema 2001; Husted 1999). In such a culture, 
senior public officials, who believe they are entitled to take bribes, are more likely to pressure 
their juniors in other SOEs for illegal payments before they allow the provision of various public 
services. Managers in victim SOEs, owing to their higher corruption tolerance, may not resist 
bribe requests by their superiors in public and political offices when power distance is high. 
POEs, on the other hand, may not be subject to same pressures in high power distance societies. 
 State Owned Enterprises as Bribe Payers 
19 
 
POE managers may not hesitate to refuse the bribe requests by even most senior public officials 
who do not offer a sizable business benefit in exchange, while only entertaining the requests of 
only few, highly relevant officials.  
Power distance may also enhance the rent extraction motives of bribe paying SOE 
managers. As greater power distance societies are characterized by paternalistic systems (Chui 
and Kwok, 2008; De Luque and Sommer, 2000; Husted 1999), SOE managers are likely to view 
superior public officials and politicians as having a paternal role. Accordingly, SOE managers, in 
anticipation of future favoritism by bribe demanding officials, tend to please corrupt officials 
through lucrative bribes. However, POE managers are less likely to be influenced by these 
considerations while deciding on the bribe requests of senior public officials.  
In summary, unlike POEs, SOE bribery in greater power distance cultures may not be 
determined by attainment of organizational goals alone. Instead, it might be partly motivated by 
submission to higher authorities, exchange of favors, and demonstrations of loyalty, which may 
reduce the ability of SOEs to effectively control the incidence of bribery. Therefore,  
Hypothesis 5. The relationship between SOEs and bribe propensity will be positively moderated 
by power distance in that SOE bribe propensity may increase more than that of POEs in 
societies with higher power distance.  
 
Data and Methods 
 
Sample 
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We took advantage of more recent World Enterprise Survey (WES) conducted by the World 
Bank during 2006 to 2013. WES is a cross-sectional survey of the managers of more than 94,000 
firms from over 120 countries. WES collects worldwide firm-level data through several rounds 
of surveys across years, developing a rich database of various firm and business environment 
specific characteristics. Related to our research on bribery, the survey contains items asking for 
the percentage of sales firms pay in bribes to public officials for achieving business related goals. 
The validity of several components of the bribery items in the survey has been confirmed by 
recent research (Uhlenbruck et al. 2006). In addition, WES data applies a stratified sampling 
approach to select the surveyed firms from the complete population of registered companies and 
surveyed firms exhibit a great deal of heterogeneity in terms of size, type of ownership, industry, 
and country of origin. It alleviates the important problems related to the unrepresentative samples, 
which is encountered in many cross-country studies (Beck et al. 2006).   
We employed the latest available survey results in each country to form a cross-sectional 
dataset. We constructed our sample in three steps. First, we excluded observations with missing 
information for our main variables of interest i.e. bribery and firm ownership. Second, we 
excluded all observations from countries for which no SOEs were surveyed by the WES. Finally, 
we merged our data with five country-level data sources, the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators, the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International, the Democracy Index provided by The 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), and Hofstede’s (2001) cultural indices. Our final sample 
consisted of 30,249 firms from 50 countries. Table 1 presents a brief summary of our sample. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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We performed several statistical tests to control for any systematic correlation between the 
main variables due to the measurement method. First, we applied the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
(Siegel and Castellan, 1988) to assess the impact of nonresponse bias by comparing the 
observable characteristics of bribe paying firms against other firms. We did not find evidence for 
significant differences between firms, who reported that they engage in bribery and firms who 
did not. Second, we performed a confirmatory factor analysis to control for the effect of a single 
unmeasured latent method factor. We compared the fit of a model that included the latent method 
factor with a model that did not (Podsakoff et al. 2003). We did not find evidence indicating that 
common method bias and common method variance exist in our sample. 
 
Measures 
 
Dependent Variables. Our study examines how the bribe propensity is influenced by institutional 
factors. We obtained the measure of bribe propensity from the WES survey in which participants 
are requested to indicate the percentage of annual sales paid to public officials in informal 
payments for getting things done. The responses for this question are reported in percentages.  
To measure bribe propensity, defined as the likelihood of participation in bribery by a 
given firm, we encoded all firms who reported bribery activities with the value of one and the 
value of zero otherwise. Hence, we obtained a binary variable measuring whether or not a firm 
bribed in given year. This measure of bribe propensity has a theoretical basis similar to those 
used in previous bribery and ethics studies (Morgan 1993; Zhou et al. 2013).  
Independent Variable. Our main independent variable indicates whether the given firm is 
an SOE based on the percentage of shares held by government. While any shareholding by 
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government may indicate government interference and interest in an organization, the properties 
specific to SOEs (i.e. alignment of state-firm objectives, agency issues etc.) may be more salient 
in firms that are predominately under state control via majority state ownership (Inoue et al. 
2013; Liang et al. 2015; Musacchio et al. 2015). Therefore, we treated our main independent 
variable, SOE, as a binary variable, which equals one if at least 50% of a given firm’s shares 
were owned by the government and zero otherwise. However, to affirm that our results are not 
driven by our specification as to what constitutes an SOE, we also run various robustness tests 
under different specifications of SOEs and our results remained largely the same.  
Moderators. Following our hypotheses, we included four institutional factors at the 
political, regulatory, social, and cultural levels as possible moderators.  
Our first moderator, democratic system, is measured by the Democracy Index, provided by 
the EIU, which collects and provides country-specific information annually. This index measures 
the state of democracy in 167 countries based on 60 indicators grouped in five different 
categories including pluralism, civil liberties, press freedom, and political culture. Higher scores 
indicate a leaning toward a more democratic system.  
We obtain our second moderator, rule of law, from World governance indicators (WGI) 
database provided by Kaufmann et al. (2010). This variable captures perceptions of “the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence” (Kaufmann et al. 2010, p4). This indicator is measured based on the views of 
businesses, citizens, and expert survey respondents across multiple countries. The composite 
measure scores between -2.5 to +2.5, whereas higher scores indicate improved quality of legal 
institutions in a particular country.  
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Our third moderator, perception of corruption, is based on the Corruption perception index 
(CPI) provided by Transparency International. This index is the most comprehensive quantitative 
indicator of cross-country corruption available, which measures the perceived levels of public 
sector corruption across countries annually. It has been used as the means for measuring the 
prevalence of corruption in a society (DiRienzo et al. 2007). The CPI is measured on a 
continuous scale and the scores on corruption perception index range from 0 to 10. We converted 
scores in 2012 and 2013 in accordance with those in 2011 and double checked the ranking of 
countries to ensure the consistency. We reversed the coding of this measure in that higher scores 
imply a higher level of corruption in a particular society.  
The final moderator in our study, power distance, is derived from the cultural dimensions 
constructed by Hofstede (2001). Hofstede Power Distance Index (PDI) captures the extent to 
which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations in a country presume that 
power will be distributed unequally (House et al. 2013; Waldman et al. 2006; Wollan et al. 2009; 
Zheng et al. 2013). We operationalized power distance through country-specific time invariant 
Hofstede cultural scores as provided by the website of Greet Hofstede. The higher the value 
along this index, the greater the power distance. 
Control Variables. We followed prior research in controlling for a comprehensive set of 
firm- and country-level determinants of bribery and corruption. Many scholars have noted that 
smaller firms may have a higher propensity to bribe because they lack the power to resist bribe 
demands, and also lack the internal procedures to effectively monitor corruption (Arvis and 
Berenbeim, 2003; Herrera and Rodriguez, 2003; Zhou and Peng, 2011). Therefore, we controlled 
for firm size as a continuous variable measured by the logarithm of the total annual sales. As 
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sales were reported in local currencies, we converted all sales to USD by using the exchange rate 
for the year in which WES collected data for that particular firm.   
As indicated by Tilley (2000) and Amato and Amato (2007), younger firms are more likely 
to become involved in unethical and fraudulent activities such as bribery because they tend to 
focus more on survival and growth at early stages. Accordingly, we controlled for firm age, 
which was measured by the number of years since the establishment of the firm.  
We also controlled for foreign ownership as foreign owned firms may not be subject to the 
same institutional pressures as domestically owned firms (Kostova et al. 2008) and therefore, 
exhibit different bribery behavior. We measured foreign ownership by the percentage of total 
assets of the firm that are dependent on foreign capital (Lee and Weng, 2013). 
In addition, Wu (2009) noted that the use of external auditors is considered one of the most 
important obstacles to corruption. We controlled for this effect by including external audit, a 
dummy variable that equals one if the establishment has its annual financial statement checked 
and certified by an external auditor, and zero otherwise. All of these firm-level variables were 
obtained from the WES.  
Moreover, we controlled for a number of institutional factors that have been found to 
influence firm-level bribery in previous research. Since Wu (2009) empirically found that the 
integrity of the court system tends to reduce the propensity of firms to bribe, we incorporated 
court system, which is measured by country-specific perceptions about whether the court system 
is fair, impartial, and uncorrupted. It is measured as an ordered variable, which ranges between 1 
and 4. Higher scores indicate the perception of better court systems.  
Furthermore, we controlled for cultural influences by including individuality and long term 
orientation as both of these dimensions have been found to be negatively correlated with 
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corruption and bribery (Cullen et al. 2004; DiRienzo et al. 2007; Husted 1999). Measures on 
cultural dimensions were obtained from Hofstede cultural scores. Last, we used a group of 
dummy variables to control for potential industry, region, and year effects.  
 
Results 
 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for all variables. In our 
sample, around 22% of firms were found to engage in bribery. The highest correlation coefficient 
is below 0.7, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem. In addition, our variance inflation 
factor (VIF) for all independent variables and interaction terms ranged between 1.01 and 4.26, 
much lower than the threshold value of 10 (Hsieh et al. 2003). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Given our dependent variable, bribe propensity, is a binary one, we employed Probit model 
with robust standard errors to estimate the coefficients for our explanatory variables and 
interaction terms. We also followed the approach of Long (1997) to calculate the marginal 
effects for our regression coefficients. Table 3 reports the regression results with bribe propensity 
as the dependent variable. Model 1 in Table 3 is the baseline model that includes only control 
variables. Model 2 adds the main explanatory variable, SOE, and the main effects of democratic 
system, rule of law, perception of corruption, and power distance. Model 3 is the full model with 
all explanatory variables, moderators, and interaction terms. Each subsequent model represents 
an improvement over the respective baseline models in terms of log-likelihood of estimation.   
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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In Model 1 of Table 3, our statistical results for control variables are largely consistent 
with previous studies. We find the likelihood of firms to engage in bribery decreases with 
increase in firm size (p<0.01), firm age (p<0.001), foreign ownership (p<0.05), and presence of 
external auditor (p<0.05) (Amato and Amato, 2007; Arvis and Berenbeim, 2003; Herrera and 
Rodriguez, 2003; Svensson 2003; Tilley 2000). Among institutional factors, our results indicate 
that court system (p<0.001) and individuality (p<0.001) tend to reduce bribe propensity, 
consistent with previous research. In contradiction with past studies however (Cullen et al. 2004; 
DiRienzo et al. 2007; Husted 1999), we find that long term orientation tends to increases bribe 
propensity (p<0.001).  
Model 2 tests our first hypothesis, which proposes that SOEs have a lower likelihood to 
bribe. Consistent with our expectations, the coefficient of our main variable, SOE, is negative 
(p<0.05), supporting Hypothesis 1. The effect size is also substantial as we find that, on average, 
SOEs are 12% less likely to bribe than POEs. Model 2 also includes the main effects for 
democratic system, rule of law, perception of corruption, and power distance. As expected, our 
results show that democratic system (p<0.05) and rule of law (p<0.001) tends to reduce bribe 
propensity, while perception of corruption (p<0.001) and power distance (p<0.01) increase it.  
Model 3 tests our Hypotheses 2 to 5. Hypothesis 2 posits that improvements in democratic 
systems lead to a significant reduction in bribe propensity for SOEs compared with POEs. The 
coefficient of the interaction term between SOE and democratic system is negative and 
significant (p<0.1), providing supports to our Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 proposes that 
deterioration in rule of law has a relatively higher impact in increasing bribe propensity for SOEs 
than that for POEs. The result of interaction term between SOE and rule of law is positive and 
significant (p<0. 1), supporting hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 4 predicts that worsening perception of 
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corruption (indicated by a higher CPI score) has a relatively higher impact on SOE bribe 
propensity compared with POEs. The result of interaction term between SOE and perception of 
corruption is positive and significant (p<0.05). Hence, we find support for Hypothesis 4. Finally, 
Hypothesis 5 proposes that power distance has a more profound impact on SOE bribe propensity 
than POE bribe propensity. As expected, the coefficient of moderating term is positive and 
significant (p<0. 05), supporting Hypothesis 5. The effect sizes of these coefficients are also 
large. We find that one standard deviation improvement in democratic system and rule of law 
and one standard deviation reduction in perception of corruption and power distance from their 
respective means will result into respectively 7%, 13%, 4% and 10% greater reduction in SOE 
bribe propensity as compared to POEs.  
 
Post-hoc Analyses 
 
Besides main results, we also tested the impact of some additional moderators on bribery 
behavior of SOEs. First, we evaluated how the governance in an institutional system impacts 
SOE bribery. Out of six governance indicators provided by WGI, we chose to test the impact of 
control of corruption, as it appears to be most relevant to the topic of bribery. While we found 
control of corruption to reduce firm bribery in general, we did not find any significant interaction 
effect, indicating that control of corruption may not have any differential impact on SOE bribery. 
In addition, while our democracy index already includes media freedom, current research 
increasingly evaluates the impact of media on corporate conduct (e.g. Brunetti and Weder, 2003; 
Camaj 2013). Hence, we separately tested the impact of press freedom while excluding 
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democracy index from our model. We found a significant and positive interaction, which 
provided further support to our hypothesis 2. The results are available on request.  
 
Robustness tests 
 
To ensure the robustness of our results to alternative measures and model specifications, we 
conducted a number of sensitivity tests. First, we tested the robustness of our findings to 
different specifications of SOEs. We used alternative cutoff points of 30% and 5% respectively 
to reclassify the SOE status of all firms. Models 4 to 7 in table 3 show the results for robustness 
tests that used these different cutoffs. As indicated in table 3, the results in models 4 to 7 are 
qualitatively consistent with our main results in Models 2 and 3. Furthermore, we also used a 
continuous measure of SOE, indicating the percentage of shares in a firm held by government 
and obtained consistent results. Moreover, some scholars (e.g. Jones and Mygind, 1999; Meyer 
et al. 2014) have used ultimate controlling shareholder approach while operationalizing firm 
ownership as a binary variable. Following this approach, we reclassified a firm as SOE if 
government had the highest shareholding as compare to any other segment of shareholders. Our 
results stayed largely the same under this alternate specification. Finally, given most SOEs 
originate from transitional economies, we further tested the robustness of our results for the 
subsample in transitional economies. Our exercises produce similar results.  
Second, we conducted propensity score matching (PSM) to test the reliability of our results. 
PSM helps to alleviate such concerns by matching firms in the treatment (SOEs) and control 
conditions (non-SOEs) on observable factors, thus eliminating spurious results due to these 
factors (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). We included firm size, firm age, industry dummies and 
 State Owned Enterprises as Bribe Payers 
29 
 
year dummies as explanatory variables to obtain propensity score. By applying the 5 nearest 
neighbor matching without replacement and a caliper of 2 standard deviations, we have a sample 
of 1108 firms and the results of the exercise remain qualitatively unchanged. In addition, we 
applied Logit model as a robustness test of alternative model specifications, and the results 
remain largely consistent. Finally, we followed Shaver (1998) to test our hypotheses by splitting 
the sample into SOEs and POEs instead of using interaction terms between SOEs and 
moderating variables. We found that the main results remained unchanged under this alternative 
approach.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The goal of our study is to draw research attention towards the important problem of SOE 
bribery and to highlight the role of institutions in perpetuating SOE misconduct. By 
demonstrating the disproportionate increase in SOE bribery under deteriorating institutional 
environments, we point to an important gap in existing literature that tends to overlook SOE 
bribery on grounds of relatively lower incidence of SOE bribery. Our study strives to fill this gap 
by encompassing the theoretical underpinnings behind SOE bribery. In this endeavor, we draw 
from SOE literature and institutional theory to theorize the possible role of managers in 
determining SOE bribery. This is a notable departure from extant literature, which mainly 
focuses on bribery as a means to attain organizational objectives and assumes managers to act in 
the best interests of their organizations. Such assumptions may overlook the complex 
mechanisms regarding the multifaceted motivations behind corporate bribery. Although scholars 
(e.g. Cuervo-Cazurra 2006; Jeong and Weiner, 2012) have noted the possible influence of the 
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motivations of managers on firm bribery, this dimension of bribery has yet to be fully explored. 
Our study revitalizes this theoretical account by extending it to the overlooked context of SOE 
bribery, a phenomenon hard to justify under the conventional framework in bribery literature. In 
so doing, we reveal the opportunity, and also the need, to acknowledge the diversity of motives 
behind corporate bribery. 
We also extend research on the differential impact of home-country institutions on SOE 
bribery behavior. As argued by Kostova et al. (2008), institutional influences vary across 
different types of organizations. Extending their arguments into SOE context, we demonstrate 
that institutions have a more profound impact on SOE bribery partly because they determine the 
effectiveness of SOE monitoring and extent of agency problems (Estrin et al. 2016; Gedajlovic 
and Shapiro, 1998; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Nguyen 2006). Hence, we pave the way for 
segregating the drivers of bribery based upon the unique characteristics of organizations, which 
may lead to more fine grained analysis of corporate bribery. 
Furthermore, while SOE literature provides valuable insights on SOE monitoring (e.g. 
Cuervo-Cazurra 2006; Estrin et al. 2016; Laffont and Tirole, 1993), we map the role of 
interconnected and hierarchical SOE structures on agency issues in SOEs. Especially when an 
institutional system leans more on social ties instead of meritocracy, SOE managers may be 
tempted to establish their personal connections with senior officials across government apparatus, 
even by sacrificing the interests of their organizations. A deeper analysis of the impact of SOE 
hierarchical structure may uncover more facets of agency problems in SOEs. 
Besides offering the prospects for theoretical advancements, our research carries important 
practical implications. Primarily, we uncover an overlooked channel of corruption that fruitlessly 
waste precious public funds. We emphasize the need of understanding the unique drivers behind 
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SOE bribery in order to take more targeted interventions. For instance, if the extent of POE 
bribery is mainly determined by cost and benefit analyses (Jeong and Weiner, 2012), a legal 
crackdown against corporate bribery may be more effective against POE bribery as it may 
increase the costs and risks underlying bribe payments. However, curbing SOE bribery may 
require deeper institutional and policy reforms that could minimize the dependence of SOE 
managers on their superiors and link the careers of SOE managers with firm performance. 
Our analysis also reveals specific actions governments and policy makers can take to 
mitigate SOE bribery. Mainly, we suggest that introducing democracy or reducing power 
distance is essential to curb SOE bribery in the long run. However, governments can also take 
immediate measures. First, governments may introduce more transparent and merit based 
systems for promotions of SOE managers. Such measures may enable SOE managers to not only 
refuse bribe requests by senior officials but also resist any other illegitimate demands by their 
superiors. In addition, while we concur with prior research (e.g. Dharwadkar et al. 2000; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; La Porta and López-de-Silanes, 1999; Lee et al. 2010) that many SOEs are 
not created to generate profits in a way similar to POEs, we argue that a ignoring financial 
considerations may lead to unnecessary wastage of resources for unproductive purposes like 
bribe payments. Therefore, governments must link the incentives of SOE managers with cost 
controls and efficiency enhancements. Finally, we emphasize the need of strong regulations and 
clear ethical guidelines, particularly related to the distinction between bribery and gifting. 
Possibly, governments can prohibit managers from personally using any gifts given by POEs or 
SOEs. Such systems are functioning in many developed countries where any gifts received by 
public officials are transferred to their respective organizations. 
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We acknowledge some limitations of our study, which may also guide future research. We 
have conducted our research using WES data, which has been extensively employed in prior 
bribery studies. However, due to the sensitive nature of bribery question, WES employs indirect 
questioning technique to inquire about organizational bribery. The probability of information 
concealment by survey respondents still exists even though the World Bank takes several 
measures to ascertain the accuracy of responses. While scholars have confirmed the usefulness of 
indirect questioning (Campbell 1950; Holmes 1968; Neeley and Cronley, 2004; Sherwood 1981) 
and appreciated the validity of WES data (Lee and Weng, 2013; Uhlenbruck et al. 2006), caution 
should be exercised while interpreting our findings. Furthermore, WES data may not fully reveal 
the subtleties regarding the involvement of managerial rent extraction in bribery decisions. 
Further research could use more sophisticated techniques such as in-depth interviews or 
qualitative research to investigate the role of managers in determining corporate bribery. Also, 
the current datasets used in bribery research, including ours, are mostly cross-sectional. Future 
researchers may look for longitudinal datasets to better reflect on the causal relations underlying 
bribery. 
In addition, similar to most bribery research, our focus is limited to bribes that are paid to 
achieve business objectives. This is mainly due to a limitation in the WES questionnaire, which 
specifically asks firms about bribe payments for attaining organization goals. However, 
organizational bribery can be triggered by various other motives. For instance, SOE officials can 
form corrupt networks where managers receive bribes from other entities and distribute them to 
public officials and politicians. Similar practices were reported in Brazilian SOE, Petrobras 
(CNN 2015). SOEs have also been found to bribe other SOEs and other types of entities, such as 
auditors or media, for the purposes of hiding their corrupt practices (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Li 
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2013; Sun 2004). SOE Managers can also use personal funds to bribe senior officials for buying 
promotions and career growth (Sun 2004). At first glance, such bribery may not seem to fall 
under the corporate bribery domain. However, career growth via bribery may promote 
incompetent managers on top positions and seriously undermine SOE performance. More 
importantly, these bribe paying officials may use their newly gained power to extort more bribes 
for recovering their money. Finally, rent seeking tendencies can be found among POE managers 
as well, although they may be less visible in the context of bribery. These limitations of our 
study encourage researchers to broadly view and investigate diverse bribery practices. 
Our study represents an initial step toward understanding SOEs’ graft behavior, and 
examines a subset of possible factors that could have a differential impact on SOE vs POE 
bribery. We acknowledge that SOE bribery presents a more complex problem and examining all 
of its intricacies is beyond the scope of a single study. As cases of SOE bribery have been 
reported in prominent emerging economies such as Brazil and China (e.g. CNN 2015; 
Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2014; South China Morning Post 2012), we call for future research to 
identify more drivers behind SOE bribery and examine relevant environmental contingencies 
associated with these drivers. Doing so would require explicit mechanism testing of 
organizational and personal motivations behind the incidence and magnitude of SOE bribery, 
and identifying the conditions under which certain motivations might prevail1. One useful 
starting point may be Svensson’s (2003) seminal study.  
In conclusion, our study aims at encouraging research on the critical topic of SOE bribery, 
which is increasingly getting prominence in real world. The importance of SOE bribery is 
                                                          
1 We are grateful to the Section Editor Mary Sully de Luque, as well as an anonymous reviewer, for drawing our 
attention to these important areas for future research.  
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evident not only from the recent call by OECD to investigate SOE bribery (OECD Foreign 
Bribery Report 2014), but also from the recent crackdowns by numerous governments against 
bribe paying SOEs (e.g. Chow 2013; Global Times 2014; South China Morning Post 2012). 
Theoretically as well, the differences in SOE and POE bribery behaviors highlight the need for 
integrating SOE and ethics literature to better reflect on mechanisms behind SOE bribery. We 
believe our paper is a modest entry into a vast research paradigm and future research can further 
exploit the full potential of this area.   
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Table 1 Sample distribution 
Panel A: Sample distribution by country 
Country  Obs. Percent Country  Obs. Percent Country  Obs. Percent 
Angola 589 1.95 Indonesia 1053 3.48 Romania 446 1.47 
Bangladesh 513 1.70 Iraq 462 1.53 Russia 3064 10.13 
Bhutan 230 0.76 Israel 404 1.34 Rwanda 371 1.23 
Bulgaria 892 2.95 Jordan 386 1.28 Senegal 493 1.63 
Burkina Faso 199 0.66 Kenya 1104 3.65 Serbia 285 0.94 
Burundi 258 0.85 Latvia 205 0.68 Slovenia 230 0.76 
China 1794 5.93 Lithuania 209 0.69 Sri Lanka 450 1.49 
Colombia 1496 4.95 Malawi 108 0.36 Tanzania 738 2.44 
Croatia 800 2.64 Mali 592 1.96 Togo 77 0.25 
Djibouti 174 0.58 Mauritania 195 0.64 Uganda 777 2.57 
Fiji 109 0.36 Mexico 890 2.94 Ukraine 244 0.81 
Gambia 129 0.43 Namibia 551 1.82 Uruguay 596 1.97 
Ghana 803 2.65 Nigeria 2319 7.67 Vietnam 416 1.38 
Guatemala 64 0.21 Pakistan 251 0.83 Yemen 535 1.77 
Guinea 182 0.60 Peru 1231 4.07 Zambia 959 3.17 
Guinea Bissau 99 0.33 Philippines 1132 3.74 Zimbabwe 535 1.77 
Hungary 186 0.61 Poland 424 1.40 Total 30249 100.00 
Panel B: Sample distribution by industry 
Industry  Obs. Percent Industry Obs. Percent Industry Obs. Percent 
Food 3357 11.10 Basic metals 432 1.43 Retail 4908 16.23 
Textiles 1182 3.91 
Fabricate metal 
products 
449 1.48 IT 444 1.47 
Garments 1914 6.33 
Machinery and 
equipment 
473 1.56 
Hotels and 
restaurants 
226 0.75 
Chemicals 1198 3.96 Electronics 485 1.60 Other services 5976 19.76 
Plastics and rubber 348 1.15 
Other 
manufacturing 
6548 21.65 Construction 384 1.27 
Nonmetallic mineral 
products 
721 2.38 Wholesale 1044 3.45 Transport 160 0.53 
Panel C: Sample distribution by year 
Year  Obs. Percent Year Obs. Percent Year Obs. Percent 
2006 4850 16.03 2009 3623 11.98 2012 4701 15.54 
2007 6778 22.41 2010 2949 9.75 2013 5635 18.63 
2008 102 0.34 2011 1611 5.33 Total 30249 100.00 
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Table 2 Pairwise correlations matrixa 
  Mean S.D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Bribe propensity 0.221 0.415 
            
2. SOE 0.007 0.082 -0.025*** 
           
3. Democratic system 5.141 1.581 -0.123*** -0.053*** 
          
4. Rule of Law -0.489 0.543 0.220*** -0.007 0.672*** 
         
5. Perception of corruption 6.706 1.071 0.270*** -0.007 -0.575*** -0.690*** 
        
6. Power distance 74.561 13.128 0.049*** 0.003 -0.391*** -0.406*** 0.422*** 
       
7. Firm size 1.633 0.746 -0.049*** 0.078*** 0.045*** 0.050*** -0.068*** -0.002 
      
8. Firm age 15.932 14.489 -0.051*** 0.060*** 0.174*** 0.096*** -0.135 -0.119*** 0.286*** 
     
9. Foreign ownership 0.073 0.242 -0.019*** -0.015** 0.069*** 0.047*** -0.019** -0.035*** 0.179*** 0.038*** 
    
10. External audit 0.434 0.496 -0.050*** 0.061*** 0.087*** 0.127*** -0.105*** -0.123*** 0.349*** 0.190*** 0.172*** 
   
11. Court system 2.300 0.960 -0.138*** 0.015** -0.065*** 0.104*** -0.094*** -0.041*** 0.003 -0.012* 0.022*** 0.057*** 
  
12. Individuality 27.717 11.396 -0.102*** -0.006 0.146*** 0.427*** -0.395*** -0.120*** -0.024*** 0.032*** -0.006 0.024*** 0.023*** 
 
13.Long term orientation 22.561 30.245 -0.046*** 0.084*** -0.219*** 0.162*** -0.166*** -0.051*** 0.138*** -0.051*** 0.005 0.144*** 0.122*** -0.030*** 
Note : a n=30,249. †p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 3 Probit analyses of bribe propensity 
Variables 
SOE cutoff at 50% SOE cutoff at 30% SOE cutoff at 5% 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
SOE  -0.570*** -5.046* -0.589*** -6.113*** -0.430*** -4.661*** 
  (0.132) (2.009) (0.115) (1.844) (0.082) (1.212) 
Democracy system  -0.022* -0.022* -0.023* -0.023* -0.023* -0.022* 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Rule of law  -0.602*** -0.599*** -0.601*** -0.598*** -0.602*** -0.596*** 
  (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Perception of corruption  0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Power distance  0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SOE * Democratic system   -0.080†  -0.057†  -0.032† 
   (0.044)  (0.032)  (0.017) 
SOE * Rule of law   -0.989†  -1.148*  -0.868** 
   (0.593)  (0.528)  (0.334) 
SOE * Perception of corruption   0.048*  0.040*  0.033** 
   (0.024)  (0.019)  (0.012) 
SOE * Power distance   0.047*  0.055**  0.046*** 
   (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.014) 
Firm size -0.035** -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.049*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Firm age -0.004*** -0.001+ -0.001+ -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Foreign ownership -0.090* -0.106** -0.107** -0.106** -0.107** -0.103** -0.107** 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
External audit -0.047* 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.015 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Court system -0.197*** -0.173*** -0.173*** -0.172*** -0.173*** -0.173*** -0.173*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Individuality -0.015*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Long term orientation 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fixed region effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 30249 30249 30249 30249 30249 30249 30249 
Log likelihood -14713.849 -13762.337 -13752.506 -13758.490 -13745.272 -13759.270 -13740.056 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
 
